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WELSH v. UNITED STATES: A NEW SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITION
FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
Historically, the United States has provided for and respected religious
freedom. Congress, responding to historical and constitutional considera-
tions, in addition to pressure group influences, included in the present fed-
eral draft law an exemption from military service based upon conscientious
objection.' The provision carved out an exemption for any person
.. . who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief
in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views or a merely personal moral code.2
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has frequently been called upon to
construe the Constitution as applied to statutes directly or indirectly relat-
ing to religious freedom.3  Last year the Court was faced with the task of
applying the religious conscientious objector provision to an applicant de-
nied an exemption in Welsh v. United States.4
In December of 1965 Elliott Ashton Welsh, II, refused induction into
the Armed Forces. This refusal brought to a swift close nearly two years
of administrative conflict over his draft status. In addition, his refusal set
in motion criminal five years of litigation resulting in a United States Su-
preme Court reversal of his conviction.
Early in 1964 Welsh executed and returned to his local draft board
SSS Form 150, the questionnaire required by the Selective Service Sys-
tem of all applicants for religious conscientious objector exemptions. One
section of the form required the applicant to affirm or deny a belief in a
Supreme Being, which Welsh refused to do. Another section required the
adherence to one of two pre-printed expressions of belief, one applicable
to objectors to combatant training and the other for objectors to both com-
batant and non-combatant training. Initially, Welsh signed the portion
applicable only to objectors to combatant training. However, prior to af-
fixing his signature, he found that the pre-printed statement offered failed
1 See generally Brodie and Southerland, Conscience, The Constitution, and The Supreme
Court: The Riddle of United States v. Seeger, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 306 (1966) and Russell, De-
velopment of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United States, 20 GEO. WASI. L
Rn. 409 (1952) for an excellent discussion of the Universal Military Training and Service Act
of 1948, 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended 50 U.S.C. ApP. § 456(j) (1964).
2 Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948 § 6(j), 62 Star. 612-13 (1948), as
amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (1964).
3 See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961); and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
4 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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to coincide with his position. He therefore altered the statement by strik-
ing "my religious training and," leaving his expression of belief to read:
I am, by reason of . . . belief, conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form. I therefore claim exemption from combatant training
and service in the Armed Forces. /s/ Elliott A. Welsh, II.5
Based upon this questionnaire, Welsh's local board classifed him
1-A-0. This classification, exempting him only to the extent of combatant
training, exposed him to both induction and non-combatant training. Short-
ly thereafter, Welsh requested his local board to consider his reclassifica-
tion to class I-0, exempting him from induction and non-combatant train-
ing. His request for reclassification was denied, and an appeal was taken
to the appeal board, whereupon Welsh was reclassified 1-A.
After having refused induction, Welsh was convicted and sentenced to
three years imprisonment by a district court in California. On appeal he
raised two alternative contentions, inter alia, in support of reversal. His
first point asserted that the denial of exemption by the Selective Service
System was contrary to law as set out by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Seeger.' Alternatively, Welsh argued that should he not qualify
for an exemption, the religious test resting upon the Supreme Being clause
of the statute created an unconstitutional distinction between theistic and
non-theistic religious beliefs.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applying the explicit lan-
guage of Seeger to the present case found two criteria constituting the test.
Strength of belief, although a Seeger requirement, was not in issue. The
government conceded Welsh's beliefs were as strongly held as one would
hold traditional religious convictions. Secondly, the court held Welsh to
his self-appraisal and ruled his belief was not religious as used in the
statute, thus disposing of his initial contention. Welsh admitted that his
beliefs stemmed from moral and ethical grounds and expressly character-
ized his beliefs as non-religious. Similarly, the constitutional repugnance
of the Supreme Being clause was resolved by interpreting the Seeger opin-
ion as striking that clause from the statute, sub silentio:
The facts and result of Seeger at the Supreme Court level lead to only one
conclusion: The Supreme Court deleted the 'Supreme Being' clause from
the statute . . . "in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional
doubt."7
After deciding the remaining defense contentions adversely to Welsh the
court of appeals affirmed his conviction.8
The Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals, took a different
5 Brief for Appellant at 3, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
6 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
7404 F.2d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1968).
8Id.
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view of both Elliott Welsh's application for a conscientious objector ex-
emption and the test to be applied thereto. Throughout the opinion, the
Court made attempts to analogize the beliefs and factual circumstances of
Seeger to the Welsh situation. Attention was initially directed to the simi-
larity of Welsh and Seeger both having had the benefit of a religious church-
attending upbringing, a practice not extended beyond childhood. The
churches attended were not characterized as peace churches. Both regis-
trants applied for conscientious objector exemptions some years following
their initial registration. The SSS Form 150 was filled out in each case in
similar fashion by modifying the pre-printed statement, Welsh by striking
"my religious training and," and Seeger striking only "training and." Al-
though he failed to strike exactly as did Welsh, Seeger did place quota-
tion marks around the word "religious," indicating that the word took on
a meaning other than the form intended. Further, the Court noted that
each applicant was unable to express an affirmative belief in a Supreme
Being, that both were concededly sincere in their belief that participation
in war and killing was unethical and immoral, and that their strength of
conscience was demonstrated by the choice of jail over induction.
As the Court compared the fact patterns of Welsh and Seeger, seem-
ingly only two differences appeared. First, Welsh expressly denied that
his objection to war was based on religious grounds, whereas Seeger had
espoused a religious faith in a purely ethical creed. This factual distinc-
tion was not considered crucial, however, as the Court candidly admitted,
But very few registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word
"religious" as used in § 6(j), and accordingly a registrant's statement that
his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide for those charged
with administering the exemption.9
The other distinguishing factor lay in the source of Welsh's beliefs. He
conceded that his objection was, in part at least, motivated by politics.
However, given that a substantial majority of one's beliefs are grounded in
"essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely per-
sonal moral code,"'1 it does not follow that the exemption should have
been denied. One's beliefs must be solely grounded in politics or sociol-
ogy and the like, but not resting at all upon moral, ethical, or religious
principles in order to be denied exemption under Welsh. The Court, in
applying this negative criteria to Welsh, found that his admission that his
beliefs were political was of no consequence. The requirements of the
statute were met and Welsh was "dearly" entitled to a religious con-
scientious objector exemption. In reversing the conviction, the Court
failed to reach the constitutional issues raised in the court of appeals.
9 398 U.S. 333,341 (1970).
10 Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604 (1948, amending 50
U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (1964).
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Mr. Justice Harlan, who concurred specially in Welsh, had joined the
majority opinion in Seeger five years earlier. He did join the majority in
Welsh, stating that there is a limit to the liberties that can legitimately be
taken with this statute. He found that this statute ran afoul of the re-
ligious clauses of the first amendment, and therefore agreed with the
Court's reversal. On the other hand, Justice Harlan adopted the major-
ity's test of who should be granted conscientious objector status. His rea-
soning for adopting the majority's test is dear:
Thus, I am prepared to accept the prevailing opinion's conscientious ob-
jector test, not as a reflection of congressional statutory intent but as patch-
work of judicial making that cures the defect of under-inclusion in § 6(j)
and can be administered by local boards in the usual course of business."1
The judicial power invoked by Mr. Justice Harlan is a curious one in that
it builds new concepts into a statute that would fail but for his grafting of
an addition thereon. This addition, although admittedly not a product
of statutory construction, creates a federal judicial law, affirmatively not
intended by Congress, but necessary, in Justice Harlan's view, to save
the entire statutory concept.
I. HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR PROVISIONS
A great deal of difficulty in the past has arisen from Congress tying
statutes to the word "religion." Historically, the legislative meaning of
"religion" has been restricted to organized, orthodox, theistic religions. 2
It is interesting that this county's first conscientious objector exemp-
tion, enacted in 1673 by the Colony of Rhode Island, was not tied to a
concept of religion.13 To qualify for the exemption one's conscience
merely had to forbid participation in war. This statute, one of a kind,
endured only three years.'4 Subsequent legislative acts of Rhode Island,
11398 U.S. 333,366-67 (1970).
12 See Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View In The Light Of Torcaso v. Wat-
kins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252 (1963) together with Russell, supra, note 1, for an extensive analysis
of the legislative and judicial definitions of religion.
13 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEm, 2 BACKGROUND OF SELECTIVE SERVICE, pt. 12, 13, (Spe-
cial Monograph 1, 1947), Rhode Island, Act of August 13, 1673. The pertinent section reads,
in part,
... the King's Majesty in the way of his wars doth not soe universally compell all, but
permitts some, yea very many not to trayne or fight or war for him, whose consciences
are that they ought not to learne war at all; yea, notwithstandinge his Majesty have
great warringe, and useth men of other understandings to fight, yet not those against
whose conscience it is to fight, that they who will lose their owne lives rather than de-
story other mens lives, can noe waies nor by noe means be compelled to fight to
kill; ...
14 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, 2 BACKGROUND OF SELECTIVE SERVICE, pt. 12, 18, (Spe-
cial Monograph 1, 1947). The repealing section reads,
... whereby great distrubance is in the severall Traine Bands; Therefore, for the en-
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and the other colonies as well, carefully limited the exemption to those
whose pacifist principles were religious in character. With the exces-
sive manpower demands of the Revolutionary War upon the colonies,
they haphazardly but collectively realized that an exemption without quali-
fication was insufficient. Therefore, exemptions were also qualified by re-
quiring one to supply the militia with a substitute warrior or support the
cause monetarily by payment of a commutation fee. This pattern of ex-
empting conscientious objectors, qualified to the extent of including only
religious scruples, in addition to providing substitutes and/or commutation
fees, remained largely unchanged until the Civil War.
At that point, the federal government took over the conscription re-
sponsibilities for the United States. The first federal draft act, passed in
1863, altered the previous colonial conscriptions by not exempting con-
scientious objectors, religious or otherwise, from military service."; This
oversight was remedied in 1864 by an amendment providing that consci-
entious objectors who were affiliated with (unspecified) religious denomi-
nations could be inducted only as non-combatants. 6 A $300 payment,
however, allowed an absolute exemption. The Confederacy was more
specific in defining the religions that qualified by identifying which denom,
inations were acceptable. Exemptions were granted only to Friends, Dun,
kards, Nazarenes, and Mennonites; the substitute or payment clause was
also utilized.17  The Confederate conscientious objector provision was
repealed immediately prior to the end of the War. This probably resulted
from the distrust of objectors coupled with excessive manpower needs.
The Selective Draft Act of 1917,' although recognizing religious con-
scientious objectors, no longer provided for service by substitute or pay-
ment. Each person qualifying for an exemption was bound to non-
combatant duty as defined by the President. The focus of this provision
was not the individual's religious scruples against participation in war,
but rather membership in the established peace churches, a focus which
effectively denied exemption to non-members. The exemption applied to
anyone
, * . who [was] found to be a member of any well-recognized religious
sect or organization . . . whose existing creed or principles [forbadel
its members to participate in war in any form .... 29
An important difference between the Selective Draft Act of 1917 and the
first federal draft act in 1863, as amended, was that the number of reli-
couragement of the millitia in this Collony, the said clause in the said law is made voyd,
null and repealed;...
15 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Star. 731.
16 Act of February 24, 1864, ch. 11, § 17, 13 Stat. 9.
17 Confederate States of America, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 29 (1861-1864).
18 Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4,40 Stat. 78.
10 Id.
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gious denominations within the 1863 Act was narrowed in the 1917 Act
by requiring that the denominations be "well-recognized" and the pacifist
tenets be existing. This apparently foreclosed the development of any new
creed following the passage of the Act in 1917.20
The Act of 1917 overcame a general attack in the Selective Draft Law
Cases21 in 1918 and was later bolstered and solidified by the noted Mac-
intosh2 case in 1931. The 1917 Act was repealed in 1935.
II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTION
With this historical backdrop, Congress was soon faced with providing
manpower for World War II and the necessity of a new conscription stat-
ute. The original Burke-Wadsworth Bill contained a conscientious ob-
jector provision identical to the 1917 Act including its well-recognized sects
requirement.3 In 1940, both the Senate and House Committees on Mili-
tary Affairs held hearings on the bill. Both religious and secular interest
groups denounced the narrowly drawn conscientious objector provision.2"
Religious interest groups wished to extend the narrow provision to in-
clude all religions, not merely well-recognized pacifist religions. The
Friend's Organization offered a proposal enlarging the old provision by ex -
tending the exemption to one "who individually has religious scruples
against the bearing of arms."' 5 Other groups demanded even more liberal
language. They argued for exemptions covering non-religious as well as
religious objectors. Dr. Howard Beale, a representative of the American
Civil Liberties Union, urged that the exemption should include one, "who
is merely conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form,"2
20 Contra, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 267,268 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
This new act 1917 thus followed the spirit and letter of the 1864 enactment. It re-
quired both membership in a 'peace church' and personal adherence to that church's
tenets, and added the 'war in any form' language-the requirement of total pacifism.
21245 U.S. 366 (1918).
2 2 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), along with United States v. Bland, 283
U.S. 636 (1931) and United States v. Schwimmer, 297 U.S. 644 (1929), were cases related to
the congressional intent of the conditions of naturalization. Macintosh, supra, is the case in
which Mr. Chief Justice Hughes formulated the traditional definition of religion stating in his
dissent,
The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those
rising from any human relation as was stated by Mr. Justice Field, in Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333,342: 'The term 'religion' has reference to one's view of his relations to
his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and charac-
ter, and of obedience to his will.' Id. at 633-34.
2 3 H.R. 10132; S. 4164.
24 See, Waite, Section 5(g) Of The Selective Service Act, As Amended By The Court, 29
MINN. L. REV. 22,31 (1945).
2 5 Hearings before the House Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, on
H.R. 10132, p. 152 (1940).
26 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Congress, 3rd Session
on S. 4164, p. 308 (1940).
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or to "conscientious objectors on non-religious grounds who . . . can es-
tablish the sincerity of their objections. '2 7 Many other organizations crit-
icized the proposals and offered various amendments at the hearings. Ul-
timately, the Friend's Organization, in collaberation with representatives
of the Army, offered a proposal exempting one "who by reason of religious
training and belief is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form."' as This proposal became the heart of the 1940 Act's conscien-
tious objector provision:
Nothing in this act shall be construed to require any person to be subject
to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form.2
The final 1940 Act differed from the 1917 Act in several ways. First, the
exemption was no longer tied to membership in any church, but it only
touched upon the religious scruples of the individual conscience. Also,
an applicant could object to both combatant and non-combatant service,
thus allowing the objector to be free from induction itself. This latter
change was of significant importance as evidenced by the treatment ac-
corded to conscientious objectors performing non-combatant services. The
greatest millstone the 1940 Act brought forth was assigning to the judi-
ciary the task of interpreting the broad, nebulous words, "religious train-
ing and belief."
Congress' desire was demonstrated by the legislative history of the
1940 Act and the judicial interpretation of prior "religious" provisions.
In the 1940 Act, it seemed dear that the word "religious" was used in the
traditional, historical sense meaning religion based on a concept of diety.30
Further, although the reason for Congress' rejection of an exemption cover-
ing non-religious objectors is not a matter of record, there is evidence
that there was such a rejection.a-
In 1943 a conflict arose in the federal courts in the interpretation of
the religious training and belief clause. Judge Augustus Hand of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals delivered the opinion in United States
v. Kauten,2 2 including therein a reflection on the construction that ought
to be placed on the religious training and belief clause:
There is a distinction between a course of reasoning resulting in a con-
viction that a particular war is inexpedient or disastrous and a conscientious
27 Hearings on H.R. 10132, supra, note 25, at 191.
281d. at 211.
29 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885.
80 Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View In The Light Of Torcaso v. Wat-
kins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252,270 (1963).
31 See, Conklin, supra, note 30; Russell, supra, note 1, at 426-28; and Waite, supra note 24,
at 30-31.
32 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cit. 1943).
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objection to participation in any war under any circumstances. The lat-
ter, and not the former, may be the basis of exemption under the Act.
The former is usually a political objection, while the latter, we think, may
justly be regarded as a response of the individual to an inward mentor,
call it conscience or God, that is for many persons ... the equivalent of
what has always been thought a religious impulse.3m
This construction can and has been characterized as reading out of the
statute "religious training and belief" as a modification of "conscien-
tiously" and extending the exemption to non-religious conscientious ob'
jectors.84 This dictum was hailed for its liberal interpretation by those who
attempted to implement this proposition in the original formulation of
the Act. The Second Circuit had little difficulty in extending the exemp-
tion to non-religious objectors although Congress, specifically charged with
that duty, refused to do so.
Three months later, the Second Circuit decided in a habeas corpus ac-
tion that an agnostic registrant was entitled to exemption in United States
ex rel. Phillips v. Downer-.8 5 Judge Clark cited as authority and quoted
extensively the dictum in the Kauten case. The registrant held a deep-
rooted belief that participation in any war violated a general humanitarian
concept and this belief served as a religion for him. In early 1944, Judge
Frank, speaking for the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Brandon v.
Downer,88 stated that even though the registrant before the court failed
to qualify for the exemption on other non-religious grounds, he charac-
terized the registrant's statement of beliefs as "within the statute as we
recently construed it in United States v. Kauten."' 7 The registrant was an
atheist, but stated he was opposed to participation in a war of any form
because it was morally wrong. He was denied exemption because of a
finding that, to some extent, his beliefs were not deep-rooted. Also in 1944,
the same court in United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt38 directed a lower
court to apply the Kauten test to the registrant which, as simply stated by
Judge Augustus Hand, is that an exemption should be granted if the reg-
istrant's beliefs were against participation in war of any form because of
his conscience. However, on remand, the district court held that the
registrant, Reel, was not sincere in his claim of conscientious opposition to
war in any form, and denied him relief. On appeal to the Seocnd Circuit, a
divided court reversed again and stated that there was no evidence in the
record upon which the finding of a lack of sincerity could be based.,,
In the opinion, Judge Clark offered this observation:
83 Id. at 708.
84 Waite, supra note 24.
5 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
86 139 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1944).
37 Id. at 765.
88 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944).
89 United States ex. tel. Reel v. Badt, 152 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1945).
[Vol. 32.
But our conclusion has not been accepted everywhere; ... differences in
view . . . are traceble to different conceptions of the extent of the Act.
Hence a definitive interpretation of the Act by the Supreme Court is cer-
tainly to be desired.40
But Judge Clark's desire for review was thwarted. While a petition for
certiorari was pending in the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General moved
for dismissal and the motion was granted.41
The admission that the Kauten test was not universally accepted went
without saying. In the Ninth Circuit, during 1946, a registrant sought to
rely on Kauten, Phillips, and Reel, all Second Circuit decisions, in Berman
v. United States.42 The court affirmed his conviction for failing to submit
to induction and denied his claim for conscientious objector status. The
opinion of the court construed the words "religious training and belief"
to distinguish
a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high mor-
alistic philosophy, and one based upon an individual's belief in his respon-
sibility to an authority and beyond any worldly one.43
The court frankly stated that, although the second circuit cases were
similar or identical, there was fundamental disagreement between the
rationale of the decision reached and the views expressed in Phillips and
Reel. Only minimal respect was paid to the Kauten case. The dissent
would have followed the rationale of the Second Circuit, granting Berman
an exemption. Berman petitioned for certiorari, supported by the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae; thus for the second time the
circuits' conflict was at the threshold of resolution. The petition was de-
nied and the conflict went unresolved until 1948 when Congress again was
faced with the task of enacting a conscription statute.
The legislative history of the Selective Service Act of 1948 demon-
strates the reaction of Congress to the liberal interpretation of the 1940
Act by the second circuit. The Senate Military Affairs Committee report
expressly adopted the construction placed on the 1940 provision in Ber-
man." The language of the 1948 Act itself retained the "religious train-
ing and belief" clause of the 1940 provision; but a definition section was
included,
401d. at 631 (footnotes omitted).
41328 U.S. 817 (1946).
42 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946), rehearing denied, 329
U.S. 833 (1947).
43 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1946).
,14 S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 (1948):
This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were found in subsection 5 (g)
of the 1940 Act Exemption extends to anyone who, because of religious training
and belief in his relationship to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to ...
military service (See United States v. Berman 156 F.2d 377, certiorari denied, 329 U.S.
795.)
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Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's be-
lief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.45
Congress, in formulating the definition section relied on the Berman40
opinion by paraphrasing the exclusionary "political, sociological, etc." state-
ment and utilizing Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' definition of religion in
the Macintosh47 case as the source of the "Supreme Being" clause. De-
fensively, Congress incorporated these decisions, not only into the legisla-
tive history, but also in the very words of the Act. By its actions, Congress
attempted to avoid the liberal construction the Second Circuit had placed
upon the earlier provision. Thus, Congress put forth a substantial effort
to restrict exemptions to "religious," in a traditional sense, conscientious
objectors.
The federal courts through the 1950's and into the 1960's applied the
religious conscientious objector exemption in the restricted manner which
Congress expressed in the 1948 Act. Early in 1964, the Second Circuit
again lightened the burden borne by conscientious objectors whose claims,
although sufficient under Kauten, fell short of the requirements of the
1948 Act. Judge Kaufman, in a well-reasoned opinion, reversed a regis-
trant's conviction in United States v. Seeger 8 by striking the "Supreme
Being" clause from the provision because it unconstitutionally favored
religion based upon a concept of deity. This result would have been dif-
ficult to reach had Judge Kaufman not acknowledged the effect of the 1948
revision in the Act. In fact, the government conceded that Seeger was
qualified under Kauten and would have received a conscientious objector
exemption but for the 1948 revision and the congressional expression of
approval of the Berman requirement of belief in a Supreme Being. The
government petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari attempt-
ing to resolve the conflict for the third time.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the
Second Circuit.49  In reaching it's decision, the Court did not rely on con-
stitutional grounds as Judge Kaufman had, but rather it used an expansive
interpretation of the coverage of the conscientious objector exemption in
the 1948 Act. Since Seeger's claim of exemption rested on beliefs which
were not founded in a religion based on a concept of deity, the Court had
to explain away the efficacy of the "Supreme Being" clause added by Con-
gress in 1948. The Court's analysis begins with the assertion that the
requirements of the 1948 Act are no greater than those of it's predeces-
4562 Stat 612-13 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. ApP. § 546(j) (1964).
46 156 F.2d 377, 378 (9th Cir. 1946).
47283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931).
48326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
49 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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sor enacted in 1940. In reaching such a conclusion, the Court, referring to
the Senate Report that expressly endorsed the Berman decision, stated that
• . . an explicit statement of congressional intent deserves more weight
than the parenthetical citation of a case which might stand for a number
of things. Congress specifically stated that it intended to re-enact sub-
stantially the same provisions as were found in the 1940 Act. Moreover,
the history of that Act reveals no evidence of a desire to restrict the con-
cept of religious belief.50
Having then reversed a longstanding notion as to what Congress intended,
not only in 1948 but also in 1940, the Court avoided the constitutional
issue by interpretation, saying, when Congress adopted Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes' definition of religion as used in Macintosh,,1 they purposely dis-
placed "God" in favor of "Supreme Being" to demonstrate an embrace of
all religions. The express test of Seeger then being that "religious train-
ing and belief" as connected to the "Supreme Being" clause means any
deep-rooted and sincere belief commanding a position parallel to God in
the possessor's life. This test, although expanding beyond the theistic
religion concept left the nonreligious conscientious objectors beyond the
reach of an exemption.
The stage was set by the reaction of the lower federal courts to the
inherent inadequacy of the Seeger test for the Supreme Court to decide
Welsh. Again the statutory concept of "religion" was strained to include
nonreligious conscientious objectors and to avoid the constitutional issues
raised. In United States v. Sesson,52 a Massachusetts district court held
that the conscientious objector provision unconstitutionally discriminates
against atheists and agnostics who object to war on purely moral grounds.
That opinion, however, goes further than the religious, nonreligious issue
in granting the registrant an exemption when his beliefs are deeply-held,
sincere and moral in source and content, but extending only to war in
Vietnam, not to war generally. Although novel in as much as it coun-
tenanced "selective" conscientious objection, the opinion was utilized by
other district courts as authoritative in its religious-nonreligious analysis. 3
What the Court in Welsh considered necessary to be "religious" in
the conscientious objector relationship is an extension and broadening of
the Seeger test. An applicant possessing a sincere and deep-rooted con-
scientious belief, purely moral or ethical in source and content, which
forecloses him from participation in war under any circumstances, the
court in Welsh held, is sufficiently "religious" to be entitled to an exemp-
50 ld. at 177.
5l id.
52297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
53 Koster v. Sharp, 303 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Goguen v. Clifford, 304 F. Supp. 958
(D. N.J. 1969); and United States v. Foran, 305 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Wis. 1969). See also
2 ST. MARY's L.J. 81, 88-93 (1970).
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tion. Indeed, the opinion of the Court concluded that one's beliefs need
not be founded in any form of religion in order to qualify for an exemp-
tion:
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical
or moral in source and content but nevertheless impose upon him a
duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time,
those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual "a place parallel
to that filled by.. .God" in traditionally religious persons. Because his
beliefs function as a religion in his life, such an individual is as much
entitled to a "religious" conscientious objector exemption under § 6 (j) as
is someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war from tradi-
tional religious convictions.54
Also, there exists a negative test in Welsh: one whose beliefs do not
stem from moral, ethical or religious grounds, but instead rest entirely
upon "considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency," is beyond the
reach of the exemption.
A fundamental question is raised by the very necessity of deciding
Welsh. It could be asserted that Welsh was within the boundaries pre-
viously staked out five years earlier in Seeger. This assertion is strength-
ened by Mr. Justice Black's insistence on squaring the facts of Welsh
with those of Seeger. An additional make-weight argument lies in the
general passiveness of local boards to the Seeger decision,55 Welsh thus
afforded the Court a second round, not to formulate a new or expanded
test, but to restate the identical test in an attempt to remedy the previous
administrative inattentiveness to Seeger. On the other hand, it is equally
likely that the Court became aware of the basic inconsistancy of the Seeger
criteria of the religious-nonreligious dichotomy.56  The functional ap-
proach of the religious concept taken in Seeger along with the substantive
definition of nonreligious beliefs was recognized as unfortunate and un-
clear. The necessity of the Welsh decision can be seen as expanding upon
Seeger to include in the test of religious beliefs the substantive concepts of
moral and ethical beliefs, in addition to the essentially functional parallel
concept developed in Seeger. 7 Two additional problems born in Seeger
and laid to rest in Welsh were the self-characterization of beliefs and the
balancing test. In Seeger, the Court accorded great weight to the regis-
trant's declaration that his beliefs were religious but in Welsh where the
Court was faced with a registrant characterizing his beliefs as nonreligious,
such a self-appraisal was considered of no legal consequence. Also, the
negative test of Welsh makes it quite clear that a practice of balancing the
54 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,340 (1970).
55 See, Rabin, Do You Believe It A Supreme Being: The Administration Of Conscientious
Objector Exemption, 1967 Wis. L. Rv. 642, 670-71, 674-75, 679.
56 Brodie and Sutherland, supra note 1.
57 The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 32, 230-34 (1970).
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sources of one's belief in determining whether such a belief is religious
within the statute is erroneous. Once it is established that a registrant's
belief is to any extent derived from ethical, moral, or religious sources, the
inquiry is terminated and the registrant is to be granted exemption. The
remaining portion of the registrant's belief, no matter how large or what
the source is irrelevant.
III. EFFECTS OF MORAL AND ETHICAL RELIGION
The reaction to Welsh was quick and extensive. In the first week of
July 1970, the Selective Service System issued new criteria to local boards
for the classification of registrants applying for conscientious objector
status.18 The primary test to guide local draft and appeal boards is the
sincerity of belief and that belief, if sincere, must be the primary force in
the registrant's life. Secondarily, beliefs based entirely on moral and ethi-
cal grounds are not in any way grounds for exclusion from exemption.
However, the guide expressly restricts the qualifying moral and beliefs
by requiring them to be acquired "through training, study, contemplation
. .. comparable in rigor and dedication to the processes by which tradi-
tional religious convictions . . ."9 are acquired. In addition, the new
criteria carry verbatim the negative test of Welsh.
In the Ninth Circuit, an applicant was held to be entitled to an exemp-
tion under Welsh in United States v. Coffey.60  The court found that, as
Coffey could not kill or harm anyone, and that to participate in war was
unthinkable, his beliefs were deeply-held. His beliefs were characterized
as resting on a moral principle consisting of a duty to preserve life, a duty
arising between one man and another. In drawing the analogy between
Welsh and Coffey, the court believed they both had
... a special duty to preserve life. Both believed that the duty to preserve
life was necessarily owing from one man to another.
Both thought that from this duty to preserve life there flowed a duty
radically inconsistent with participation in war... 61
Thus having found the registrant's beliefs to be religious, as characterized
in Welsh, and that those beliefs were deeply-held, or the moving force in
his life, Coffey's conviction was reversed.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Rink62 reversed an applicant's
conviction by utilizing the Welsh opinion in an imaginative and interesting
fashion. The determination had been made that Rink's religious beliefs
58 Local Board Memorandum No. 107, Criteria for Classification of Conscientious Objec-
tors, SEL SERv. L. REP. 2200:16 (1970).
59 Id. at pt. 9.
60 429 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1970).
01 Id. at 404.
02430 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1970).
19711
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
were insincere, not that his beliefs were insufficiently religious. Rink, in
applying for a conscientious objector exemption, relied in part upon his
traditional Roman Catholic religious training in addition to moral and
ethical sources for his claim. The court held that the appeal board, in
reaching the decision that his beliefs were not sincere, only considered his
traditional theistic religious beliefs, not questioning the sincereity of his
"secular" beliefs. The court stated,
He referred to his Roman Catholic training and beliefs more because he
felt the law required a religious basis for his beliefs, than that his religious
training was the true source of his beliefs. But the rejection of his claim,
so far as the record shows, is based solely on the fact that his conventional
religious beliefs were not sincere. There is no mention anywhere in his
file of the sincerity, or of the depth, of his secularly based beliefs. 3
This holding is particularly well founded, for the claim was denied prior
to Welsh, therefore a questioning of Rink's sincerity in regard of his
"secular" beliefs was irrelevant to any resolution.
There is one area of the law of conscientious objection that the Welsh
opinion seems not to have touched directly. The concept of selective con-
scientious objection has yet to be confronted directly by the Supreme
Court, as United States v. Sesson64 was disposed of for lack of jurisdiction.
Yet, the very fact that Welsh was decided by interpreting "religion" as
including nonreligious concepts, may be an indicator of the flexible atti-
tude the Court will have when the issue of selective objection is squarely
presented. Two courts of appeal cases65 turning upon this issue have been
docketed for consideration by the Supreme Court this term; hopefully a
definitive answer is forthcoming.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the outset the United States was, in essence, a refugee camp for
those seeking religious freedom from the English or continental ortho-
doxies. This attitude surfaced in 1673 with the first conscientious objector
provision, untainted with religious concepts, theistic or otherwise. From
the formalization of our Nation we turned our concerns inward supressing
the very ideal considered the moving force of our beginning. Although
arguably, the office of the judiciary may have been an improvident forum
in which to initiate (or revive) a policy of this nature, it is largely the re-
631d. at 648-49.
64 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
65 See, United States v. Session, 399 U.S. 267, 270 at n. 1:
We have today granted certiorari in Gillette v. United States (No. 1170), and Negre
v. Larsen (No. 1669, Misc.), in order to consider the 'selective conscientious objector
issue that underlies the case now before us but which we cannot reach because of our
conclusion that we have no jurisdiction to entertain this direct appeal.
Gillette v. United States, 420 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 399 U.S. 925 (1970)
and Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 399 U.S. 925 (1970).
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sult of a thirty year conflict between two circuit courts of appeal and the
refereeing efforts of the Supreme Court that have journeyed the concept of
conscientious objection almost full-circle from our original position nearly
three hundred years ago.
Jay R. Dingledy
